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The technological advances of the last decade have resulted in the commercial
market leading the military market in many areas of technological development.
As a result, the military depends on the commercial sector for increased
capabilities in many systems. The Commercial Item and Non-Developmental
Item procurement strategy has been utilized to capitalize on this development.
Using pre-existing systems to provide additional capabilities for military weapon
systems results in a shorter procurement time and enables new technology to be
used sooner. However, the logistics support of these items suffers since there is
less time to test and plan for spare parts, training facilities, and support
equipment. More assets are needed during the initial planning stages for these
items to identify and produce the support structures needed for the life of the
system. Finally, the shift of logistics support from an organic, military support
system to a commercial support system has certain cost savings that are realized
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The United States military of the twenty-first century will be faced with
many challenges. Perhaps the most formidable task facing today's military leaders
will be managing the resources at hand to accomplish the mission that is expected
of them. Downsizing the military has been a necessary, but controversial process
during the last nine years. Department of Defense (DOD) personnel end strengths
have been reduced 46 percent since 1987, and military infrastructure, or the bases,
equipment, and facilities necessary to support combat forces, has declined as well
(Ref. 2 1 :p. 1 ). While the threat of nuclear war has diminished, many new threats
are identified in President Clinton's National Military Strategy that require the
United States to maintain a military presence throughout the world (Ref. 25:p. 1).
This change in mission definition and resource availability requires a high level of
effectiveness and efficiency at all levels of military operations. "Doing more with
less" is a fiscal reality that has reached "commandment" status within the military.
One way to accomplish this is to improve the defense acquisition process so that
high quality equipment is fielded quickly and efficiently to field commanders and
their troops.
Acquisition reform initiatives have been introduced throughout this decade
that attempt to attain this goal. One of these reform initiatives is to decrease the
emphasis on full-scale development of weapon systems and increase the emphasis
on obtaining pre-existing systems: the Commercial-Items (CI) / Non-
Developmental Items (NDI) procurement strategy (CI/NDI). Using pre-existing
equipment as an acquisition solution has always been part of the acquisition
process. During the early phases of acquisition, an extensive market survey is
conducted to see if equipment exists that can meet the specific needs of the
military. Once this survey is completed, and no current alternative is found, then a
full development program is started. Recent acquisition reform legislation such as
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1 994, and the Federal Acquisition
Reform Act of 1 996, have increased the emphasis on finding these existing
systems, and many new methods to use current systems are being utilized (Ref.
14:p. 4). The use of pre-existing fire-fighting equipment aboard U.S. Naval ships
and commercially-available data terminals for U.S. Army missile systems are
recent examples of this strategy (Ref. 16:p. 6).
The potential benefits to the Department of Defense from the use of CI
and NDI to meet requirements have grown in number during the 1990's, and are
the driving force behind the change currently underway in Defense acquisition.
The most common benefits are:
• Savings in procurement costs; the economies of scale of a larger
commercial market allow items to be sold at lower prices. This in turn
reduces the total cost of the system throughout the its useful life.
• Use of existing, previously-developed items, whether commercial or
military, saves research and development costs, shortens fielding time,
and reduces the risk associated with new development.
• The Department of Defense must buy from the commercial market to
access state-of-the-art technology and products since the defense
department no longer leads private industry in research, development,
and application. For example, in the fields of communications,
electronics, and computers, the pace of technological evolution
resulting from high commercial demand outstrips the capabilities of
any government research and development (R&D) program.
(Ref. 25:p. 4-3)
• Integration of the defense and commercial industrial bases. DOD
requirements that are integrated into commercial production are far
more likely to have a stable and existing industrial base to draw from
if there is a surge in requirements due to an emergency. Additionally,
in times of reduced procurement, DOD business is not sufficient to
keep many defense-unique suppliers in business. Integrated
commercial and defense production is beneficial for the nation's
security and economy in the long run. (Ref. 25 :p. 4-3)
Buying and using commercial and non-developmental items also presents
some challenges and departures from normal acquisition methods. For example,
items developed primarily for non-DOD sales may require performance trade-offs
to meet DOD needs. Or it may be necessary to modify the item itself, which
requires special management to handle the new requirements of the modifications.
The challenge this thesis addresses is the logistics support of commercial and non-
developmental items. Logistics support refers to a wide range of activities and
analyses that are conducted throughout the life-cycle of a system. Examples of
these activities are developing strategies for maintenance planning, support
equipment, and manpower considerations. Many of these activities are
accelerated or abbreviated during a CI/NDI acquisition, which can result in an
inadequate support system being implemented for a weapon system once it is
manufactured and fielded. (Ref. 25 :p. 4-4)
This thesis will look at the three basic levels of systems support for
CI/NDI items: full commercial support, full government support, or a
combination of both. Full commercial support allows the civilian company
providing the product to support it through its lifetime. Full government support
refers to an "organic support concept", or where the government creates a supply
and repair infrastructure for the system, and replenishes that infrastructure
through the commercial industry. A combination of these two strategies refers to
shared responsibility between the government and the contractor to provide
specific items, training, and facilities that will ensure the weapon system is fully
supported throughout its service life. Each of these must be considered during the
acquisition process to ensure the product that is fielded to U.S. military forces will
have the spare parts, technical manuals, maintenance and operator training, and
eventual disposal support needed to make it an effective addition to the military
arsenal.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to compare the effectiveness of three
different methods of systems support for a procurement program using the
CI/NDI strategy. For each method of support, the measure of effectiveness will
focus on the integration of spare parts and support equipment into the Naval
supply system, the implementation of training plans for operational and
maintenance personnel, and the effect of spare parts availability on operational
readiness. This will be accomplished by conducting an examination of the
support strategies used for equipment purchased for the P-3C Orion Anti-Surface
Warfare (ASUW) Improvement Program (AIP). This program was initiated in
1993 to rapidly increase the P-3C Orion's operational capabilities in the areas of
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Over-the-Horizon Targeting (OTH-T),
Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C3I), and survivability (Ref.
23 :p. 1). The program uses pre-existing systems to integrate new capabilities into
the current P-3C Orion platform. The program implements commercial support,
government support, and a "hybrid" support, which is a combination of the two.
The aim of the study is to find the best strategy for supporting this program and to





• Is there an ideal method of providing logistic support for Commercial
and Non-Developmental Items used in the P-3C AIP Program?
2. Secondary Research Questions
• What are the advantages and disadvantages when using a CI/NDI
procurement strategy?
• What are the primary logistic support strategies used by DOD for a
CI/NDI procurement strategy?
• What form of logistics support was contracted for at the beginning of
the program and what were the advantages and disadvantages of that
support strategy?
• What form of logistics support is currently provided for the P-3C
Orion AIP program?
• What ways are available to improve the effectiveness of logistic
support for CI/NDI programs similar to the P-3C Orion AIP program?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
The scope of this thesis is limited to the logistics support strategies and
alternatives for Naval aviation weapon systems using commercial items and non-
developmental items to improve or replace existing systems. The focus will be on
the Navy's P-3C Orion AIP program, and the support strategies used to provide
logistics support to active duty squadrons using the AIP system.
E. METHODOLOGY
A thorough research of legislation, government reports, and current
acquisition regulations concerning the CI/NDI approach will be conducted.
Equipment using different logistics support strategies will then be selected. The
data on these items will be obtained from the Deputy Program Manager for the P-
3C Orion AIP program, Lockheed Martin Electronic Defense Systems, and other
military commands involved in the project. Feedback on the effectiveness of the
chosen logistics strategy will be determined via interviews with personnel at the
training and operational squadrons currently employing the system.
An analysis will then be conducted for each support method to determine
the level of integration of spare parts and support equipment into the Naval supply
system, the implementation of training plans for operational and maintenance
personnel, and the effect of spare parts availability on operational readiness.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be made outlining the benefits and
drawbacks of each method.
ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I provided an
introduction. Chapter II will provide an overview of the current acquisition
process, a history of acquisition reform, and the CI/NDI strategy. Chapter III will
provide an overview of logistics support and its relevance to a CI/NDI strategy,
including the advantages and challenges of the CI/NDI strategy. Chapter IV will
cover the P-3C Orion AIP program, including its procurement history, support
philosophy, current methods of support, and performance to date. Chapter V will
be an analysis of different support strategies used for several different types of
equipment used in the AIP program. Emphasis will be on the integration of spare
parts and support equipment into the Naval supply system, the implementation of
training plans for operational and maintenance personnel, and the effect of spare
parts availability on operational readiness. Chapter VI will be a summary of all
the information presented, as well as conclusions and recommendations.
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II. BACKGROUNDAND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the participants
and legal framework of the defense acquisition system, the planning system that
manages defense acquisition, and how acquisition reform affected the use of
commercial items and non-developmental items during the acquisition process.
B. PARTICIPANTSAND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Defense acquisition centers around a Program Manager (PM) for each
respective system being procured. This is usually a military officer trained in
acquisition matters, appointed by the defense department whose primary
responsibility is the cost-effective and timely procurement of weapon systems for
military use. In order to accomplish this, the PM must coordinate all actions
between three principal entities: The Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch,
and private industry. This coordination creates a "triangle" of reports, legal
requirements, and communication that is orchestrated by the program manager
and his/her staff. As Figure 1 . shows, this coordination and management of a








DAB - Defense Acquisition Board
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation
PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
Figure 1. The Program Manager's Environment (Ref. 2: p.6)
The main authority and guidance from the Executive Branch comes from
executive orders, the national security strategy, and presidential decision
directives (Ref. 2:p. 8). The President, DOD, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the Department of State, and the National Security Council are
the key members of the Executive Branch that issue guidance on the task of
National Security, military roles and missions, and the focus of the National
Military Strategy. The Legislative Branch provides the statutory authority that is
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the legal foundation for systems acquisition. Congress interacts with the Defense
acquisition system through annual authorization and appropriations legislation,
numerous acquisition-related laws and regulations. Additionally, there are a
number of audit and oversight committees. Private industry provides the products
and services needed by the government for defense activities, and includes large
and small businesses.
The three most prominent documents that provide legal framework for
Defense Acquisition are the OMB Circular A- 109, DOD Directive 5000.1,
Defense Acquisition, and DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory Proceduresfor
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS). OMB Circular A- 109 defines the system
acquisition process in terms of needs, capabilities, priorities, and resources, and
establishes basic acquisition policy for all federal agencies. (Ref. 2:p. 9)
DOD Directive 5000.1, dated 15 March 1996, is another broad-based
document that states the policies and directives for all DOD acquisition programs
and identifies the officials and forums that are involved in setting these policies.
This is the document that describes and explains the integrated management
framework of acquisition, and breaks down the process into three major areas
called Decision Support Systems. They are (1) requirements generation, (2)
acquisition management, and (3) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PBBS). Each system is designed to be an ongoing processes, continually
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updating and attempting to optimize the best strategy to meet the needs of the
military. It is a flow of resources and time that depends heavily upon the current
military leadership to make decisions on allocating scarce resources to the right
area, at the right time.
DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, dated 23 March 1998, is a guideline for
mandatory procedures when procuring MDAPs and MAISs, as well as
establishing a simple and manageable framework for converting military
requirements into procurement programs. This is the document where specific
guidelines and regulations are set forth in the acquisition management support
system. It is also where OMB Circular A- 109 is expanded to provide a single
uniform system for planning, designing, developing, procuring, maintaining, and
disposing of all equipment, facilities, and services for DOD (Ref. 4:p. 7).
C. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM
This section provides an overview of the planning process for acquisition
management and the procedures and guidelines that are implemented when the
military procures goods and services. This will be accomplished by summarizing
the three broad areas of requirements generation, acquisition management, and the







Figure 2. Three Major Support Systems (Ref. 20: p. 3:2)
1. Requirements Generation
When the acquisition process identifies a need for a new hardware system,
three necessary documents must be generated. They are the Mission Area
Analysis (MAA), the Mission Need Statement (MNS), and the Operational
Requirements Document (ORD). Once all non-material solutions are eliminated,
non-developmental item acquisition is the first strategy considered. Procuring
new equipment can occur for a number of reasons, including:
• replacing an existing system that has become obsolete;
• countering a new threat that has been identified as needing a material
solution;
• mission definition within the DOD has changed and a need has been
identified for new equipment;
• new technology has been used in existing programs or has caused new
systems to develop that can meet a current material need.
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(a) Mission Area Analysis (MAA)
The acquisition process begins with a Mission Area Analysis,
which is conducted by the Service component. The Service component refers to
the military authority within the Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps that is
responsible for the acquisition of weapon systems. It is a continuing process that
identifies perceived threats, technology changes, and inputs from operational
personnel that may indicate a need for modification to existing equipment or
development of a new system. This analysis may indicate the Service component
has a deficiency or need that requires a military doctrine change or a material
solution. If a doctrine change is not the solution, then a material solution is
considered. The commercial market is extensively reviewed in a market survey to
identify systems that may fulfill the requirements of the perceived need. This is
critical in reducing the total cost of procurement in terms of research and
development costs, since the commercial market is outpacing military technology






























Figure 3. Mission Need Determination (Ref. 20: p. 4:2)
(b) Mission Need Statement (MNS)
The Mission Need Statement is also developed by each Service
component and is a product of the MAA. Continual assessment of current and
projected capabilities are completed, and comparing them to the National Military
Strategy results in a broad statement of need that can be distilled later into a
system-specific requirement. The MNS is the document that presents the military
need in operational terms and results in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum
(ADM) being issued if a material solution is finally accepted. This decision
process is depicted in Figure 4. (Ref. 1 :p. 42)
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Figure 4. Mission Need Statement Flow (Ref. 20: p.4-2)
Once a MNS is formulated, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
chaired by the Vice Chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews the MNS to
verify the material need, and routes it to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition & Technology (USD (T&A)). A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
could be assigned by the USD (T&A) to conduct another assessment of the need
and recommend possible concepts that could apply to the need. (Ref. 1 :p. 43)
Material solutions are classified according to five basic factors: the
amount of development risk, the level of urgency in its acquisition, political
interests, funding thresholds, and joint program status. Arguably the most
important factor is funding, and this is the factor that divides all acquisition
programs into five distinct categories, known as Acquisition Categories (ACATs).
Each program is assigned a category based on the level of money needed for
Research and Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), total procurement
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cost, and the level of authority needed for approval. Authority to approve a
system is known as Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and is delegated to the
lowest level possible in relation to how much money and resources are being
committed to a program. The five different funding levels for ACATs are
summarized in Figure 5 below.
"ACAT" FUNDING LEVELS
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Figure 5. Acquisition Categories (ACATs) (Ref. 20:p. 4-5)
Funding is attained through different "colors" of money, such as
procurement appropriations, Research and Development (R&D) appropriations,
and Operational and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations. This stratification of
money plays a key factor in determining how a program is funded, and the PM
must formulate strategies to use each source of funding legally and effectively.
An example of this would be to ensure an adequate level of initial spare parts are
purchased with procurement funds, instead of using O&M funds.
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Finally, the MNS is submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC). Once this council validates and approves a MNS, it is sent to
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD(A&T))
whose approval authorizes the program to move to the acquisition management
phase.
(c) Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is where specific
objectives and minimum requirements are evolved from the MNS. It is the "raw
material" that is utilized in the acquisition management process that produces a
weapon system from the MNS, and provides the refinement of the idea of a
weapon system into specific material requirements.
2. Acquisition Management
Managing the purchase of a weapon system for the military is divided into
periods of time called phases. Each phase ends with the accomplishment of a
Milestone decision, or permission to proceed to the next phase. It is an event-
driven process that usually spans eight to sixteen years and is very complex, but
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Figure 6. Acquisition Milestones and Phases (Ref. 1 : p. 45)
Phases are where action is taken to further define and develop the system
in order to meet all the requirements that are put forth in the ORE). Milestones are
where a series of questions are asked and answered in terms of seven basic
program considerations:
• comparison to established baselines for cost, schedule, and
performance;
• analyzing program performance with respect to time, versus planned
completion dates;
• program definition compared to the original design;
• what level of planning is enough to establish exit criteria;
• what risk level is there in terms of cost, schedule, and performance.
When a program reaches milestone 0, the designated Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) grants approval to conduct concept studies. These studies
begin to outline exactly what type of material solution will be used to meet the
needs stated in the Mission Needs Statement (MNS), and will provide the
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precursor to the ORD. The MDA will then determine the lead organization, a
minimum set of alternatives to be examined, and exit criteria from Concept
Exploration (CE), or Phase 0. Many short-term, parallel and competitive studies
are conducted to find out if better alternatives could be used, and what the merits
of the concept are. Phase usually lasts 1 to 3 years and is generally low-cost.
Milestone I grants authority to begin a new acquisition program, and approves the
acquisition strategy and concept baseline. Also, exit criteria for Phase I and Cost
as an Independent Variable (CAIV) objectives are established. (Ref. 1 :p. 48)
The program reaches Milestone II, approval to enter Engineering,
Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), once all Phase I criteria are met. This
point is where developmental baselines are established, which refines the concept
baseline into cost, schedule and performance objectives to be met. An initial
production base is now established by identifying items for Low-Rate Initial
Production (LRIP). This is a good tool that is used to measure the logistical
support system before full-rate production is reached. Phase II is reached once
Milestone II is completed, which is where full development, engineering , design,
and manufacture of the system is achieved. A test and evaluation system is
established to demonstrate all the manufacturing and production processes
involved. The objective of Phase II is to establish a production and support base,
and demonstrate that the weapon system has the operational capability to satisfy
the mission need. Once the system is fielded, modifications may be needed.
(Ref. l:p. 50)
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3. Resource Allocation Process (RAP)
Resources for acquisition are the same as for most other endeavors:
money, personnel, and material. Resource allocation refers to the 4 phases of
Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPBS), Enactment, Apportionment, and
Execution. The PPBS is the official management system used by the Department
of Defense which formulates the spending strategy for funds approved for DOD
in the President's budget submission. It is a formal, systematic structure that
facilitates decision-making in allocating scarce resources to all the Services. The
ultimate objective is to provide the best mix of forces in view of real fiscal
restraints. (Ref. 1 :p. 5 1
)
Enactment refers to a congressional review of the President's budget, and
the subsequent hearings and debates over expenditures. This phase ends when the
President signs the authorization and appropriation bills generated by Congress.
Apportionment occurs when the Office ofManagement and Budget provides the
funds specified in the Enactment Phase to DOD and the rest of the Federal
Government. Execution refers to the actual expenditure of the funds on defense
programs. Figure 7 shows the relationships between these phases. (Ref. 1 :p. 52)
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Figure 7. Resource Allocation Process (Ref. 20: p. 4-7)
This overview is presented here to demonstrate that the established system
of procurement is complex, and time-consuming. It is not intended for the reader
to gain a full knowledge into the entire PPBS timeline. Although this method is
very complex, it is extremely thorough and examines every possible aspect of
procurement to identify the best possible combination of operational need and
available resources. As the next sections reveal, the recent changes in technology,
politics, and culture have changed the way this process is viewed by DOD, and a
shift in focus has resulted in an organization looking for a better way to capitalize
on many new methods of acquisition.
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D. ACQUISITION REFORM
This section will discuss the history of acquisition reform in the
Department of Defense and the increased emphasis on Commercial Items (CI).
1. History of Reform
Reform in the Acquisition community has been a elaborate and somewhat
frustrating process that has had several attempts and restarts. A 1992 GAO
Report states that reform can be traced as far back as 1 794 when cost overruns
and schedule delays in the Navy resulted in delivery of only 3 of 6 Frigates
ordered (Ref. 9:p. 18). This section will provide an overview of some reform
efforts of the recent past, and outline the changes made in recent years.
Acquisition reform is not a new concept. In 1 947, the same year as the
establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD) , the Hoover Commission
was tasked with reviewing the Executive Branch of government and making
recommendations as to how it might be better managed and organized. The
commission's Eberstadt task force on the National Security Organization
concluded that the new organization "neither worked well nor yielded maximum
security for the defense dollar." Additionally, it noted that intense inter-service
rivalry "hampered and confused" policy. The task force recommended that
greater authority be granted to the Secretary of Defense, and that the military
budget system be overhauled. (Ref. 10:p. 59)
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In the early 1960's, Robert S. McNamara was appointed as Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) and his attempt to grapple with the "Military Industrial
Complex" legacy of World War II led to establishment of many of the procedures
and regulations that are still used today. The Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), formerly known as the Five Year Defense Program, and the Planning
Programming and Budgeting System (PBBS) find their origins during this period.
Debatably, McNamara' s strategies actually succeeded in fielding effective
weapon systems, but at the cost of efficiency, since the process was refined into a
complex maze of requirements and rules. In 1972, the Commission on
Government Procurement acknowledged the need for a philosophical shift in the
government's acquisition policies. The focus of the shift was intended to be away
from the developmental items and towards the commercial marketplace. (Ref. 5:p.
1-1)
The beginning of the modern acquisition reform movement can be traced
back to President Reagan's 1986 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management. Known as the Packard Commission, it was assigned the duty to
"evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine how it might be improved,
and to recommend changes." (Ref. 7:p. 41). Defense Secretary William J. Perry
assembled an Acquisition Task Force (ATF) to find solutions to the problems
noted by the commission, which led to the adoption of the Total Quality
Management concept proven by Edward Deming in Japan during the 1950s and
1 960s. The ATF identified six features of successful companies that could be
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applied to defense acquisition. Then it derived nine steps by which the DOD
could try to emulate these companies. (Ref. 7:p. 50)
streamline acquisition organization procedures
use technology to reduce cost
balance cost and performance
stabilize programs
expand the use of commercial products
increase the use of competition
clarify the need for technical data rights
enhance the quality of acquisition personnel
improve the capability for industrial mobilization
In 1989, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney created the Defense
Management Review (DMR) in response to the Packard Commission's findings.
This review focused on a "pragmatic workable set ofrecommended changes" to
the acquisition laws, and resulted in the formulation of the Section 800 panel, an
Executive-Legislative branch partnership created to streamline the legal
requirements for DOD acquisition. After 1 6 months of effort, the panel submitted
an 1,800 page report reviewing over 600 statutes, and making recommendations
as to whether they should be repealed, retained, amended, or sustained (Ref. 7:p.
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The House Armed Services Committee also conducted an extensive
review of the personnel involved in acquisition and focused on four major
questions:
1. Are the Services appointing program managers, deputy
program managers, and contracting officers with the
experience, education, and training required by law and
regulation, and are program managers being retained in their
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positions the mandatory four years or completion of a major
milestone?
2. Is there a career program structure to develop qualified and
professional acquisition personnel, both military and civilian?
3. Is there an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel
within the workforce?
4. What impediments exist that must be overcome in order to
develop a quality, professional workforce ? (Ref. 7:p. 2)
The assessment determined that many deficiencies were present in the education
and training of acquisition personnel and in 1 990 Congress passed the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in order to "improve the
effectiveness of the military and acquisition workforce through formalized
training and career development. (Ref. 7:p. 2)
2. Modern Day Reform Efforts
On March 3, 1993, the National Performance Review (NPR) was issued as
guidance to make the government more efficient. Based on the original report
"From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that works better and costs
less " by Vice President Al Gore, this document made several recommendations
for acquisition reform, and anticipated a government savings of $108 billion.
(Ref. 1 1 :p. 1) The most dramatic changes in defense acquisition came from two
primary documents: the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and
the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA). FASA granted authority to
conduct pilot programs, emphasized using COTS items, established the Federal
Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET), and reduced requirements for Cost
and Pricing Data (Ref. 12:p. 3). FARA continued to reduce requirements and
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regulations by streamlining competition requirements, repealing legislation that
inhibited Information Technology (IT) acquisition, and giving contracting officers
more flexibility in terms of limiting competition. This legislation proved that the
Congress was committed to reform.
The Department of Defense did a complete review of the DOD 5000 series
regulations and published new regulations in 1996. This is the origin of the six
themes of acquisition reform that are in force today. The first theme, teamwork,
optimizes overall performance. Using Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) early in
the acquisition process does this. The second theme, tailoring, grants the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) flexibility in applying sound business
practices in accomplishing tasks in an expedient and effective manner. The third
theme is empowerment, which balances responsibility with authority. In essence,
it allows the program manager to be very flexible early in the procurement
process, since timeliness is a key factor affecting the cost of a program. The
fourth theme is Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). It forces trade-offs
between cost, schedule, and performance in order to achieve the best value. The
fifth theme is greater use of commercial products, which recognizes the shift of
industry within the United States from government-based consumption to
worldwide consumption. This attempts to fight the obsolescence battle that
happens during the normal acquisition process. The final theme, best practices,





This section defines commercial items and non-developmental items and
also provides an overview of the acquisition of these items. A Commercial Item
(CI) is any item evolving from or available in the commercial marketplace that
will be available in time to satisfy the user requirement. They are any
combination of items customarily combined and sold to the general public.
Services (installation, maintenance, training, and other) for these items may be
procured for federal government use. These services are offered and sold
competitively, in substantial quantities, and are available in the commercial
marketplace. (Ref. 14:p. 1)
A NDI Item (NDI) is one that was previously-developed and used
exclusively for governmental purposes by a Federal Agency, a State or local
government, or a foreign government with which the United States has a mutual
defense cooperation agreement. NDI can require minor modification in order to
meet the requirements of the agency. Items that are developed and will soon be
used by the Federal, a State or Local government, or a foreign government are
also considered NDI. (Ref. 14:p. 1)
Acquisition management identifies CIs and NDIs early in the requirements
phase of procurement, and continually seeks opportunities to use them as a project
unfolds. A decision process for this is summarized on the following page in




































* h preparation for the market investigation establish objectives and thresholds for
cost, schedule, and performance based on the users' operational and readiness
requirements.
Figure 8. CI/NDI Decision Process (Ref. 14:p. 1)
Procurement guidelines are developed during the normal process, but there is
increasing emphasis on utilizing existing sources to solve any developmental
problem that arises. This strategy results in a system that meets all the needs of
the original Mission Needs Statement (MNS), but is fielded with reduced costs
and in a shorter time. A general strategy when selecting pre-existing equipment is
to ruggedize it for the specific task it is being mated to, militarize and integrate it
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with the other systems needed, and their requisite support structure, and follow
the normal acquisition guidelines to final development. This concept is
demonstrated in Figure 9.













Figure 9. Acquisition Approach for New Needs (Ref. 14:p. 4)
While the use of pre-existing systems seems to be a good idea and is being
implemented throughout the Department of Defense, a list of benefits and
drawbacks are needed to keep the strategy in perspective.
1. Advantages
The potential Department of Defense(DOD) benefits from the use of CIs
and NDIs to meet requirements have grown in number and significance over the
last two decades as the defense environment has changed. Use of previously-
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developed items, whether commercial or military, saves research and
development costs, shortens fielding time, and reduces the risk associated with
new development. First, the DOD must buy from the commercial market to
access state-of-the-art technology and products. In many of the technological
areas significant for defense items, the DOD no longer leads private industry in
research, development, and application. For example, in the fields of
communications, electronics, and computers, the pace of technological evolution
resulting from high commercial demand outstrips the capabilities of any
government Research and Development (R&D) program. (Ref. 14:p. 9)
A second important benefit from the use of commercial items is the
integration of the defense and commercial industrial bases. DOD requirements
that are integrated into commercial production are far more likely to have a stable
and existing industrial base to draw from if there is a surge in requirements due to
an emergency. Additionally, in times of reduced procurement, DOD business is
not sufficient to keep many defense-unique suppliers in business. Integrated
commercial and defense production is beneficial for the nation's security and
economy in the long run. To summarize, the main benefits for using CI/NDI are:
lower life-cycle cost, more rapid deployment, proven capability, and increased
competition. (Ref. 14:p. 11)
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2. Disadvantages
Buying and using commercial and NDI items also present some challenges
and departures from full developmental acquisition. For example, items
developed primarily for non-DOD sales may require performance trade-offs to
meet DOD needs; or it may be necessary to modify the item itself, which requires
special management to handle the ramifications of the modifications. The lead-
time from concept exploration to full-scale production is also a disadvantage to
planning and implementing a logistics support plan. Logistics support activities
normally accomplished in pre-production phases of a development program, often
have to be accelerated for acquisitions with more immediate delivery. Using
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) or relying on commercial product support
systems are frequently the best solutions. Defense logistics support systems may
have to be replaced or at least supplemented by CLS. (Ref. 14:p. 18)
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a basic framework and background on the
Defense Acquisition System by providing an overview of the main participants
and the legal framework surrounding acquisition. The Defense Acquisition
System was explained, and a history of the acquisition reform was presented.
Finally, CI/NDI procurement was summarized, and some of the benefits and
challenges from using this strategy were presented. The next chapter will discuss
the logistics challenges of using CI/NDI.
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III. COTS/NDI LOGISTICS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Logistics is the fastest moving train around. The Navy Logistics focus is
changing from a stovepipe support concept to a barrier-free environment
(Ref. 15)
This quote from RADM Raymond A. Archer III, Commander, Naval Inventory
Control Point (NAVICP), conveys the sense of rapid change that is occurring as the Navy
continues to streamline and shift from a self-contained logistics support system to a more
flexible but more uncertain commercial-dependent support. In this fast-paced
environment, it will very important for today's Program Managers to focus on the
challenges of CI/NDI support, principally training and logistics support. This chapter
will focus on logistics support of CI/NDI projects and provide the background and
analysis necessary to understand how weapon systems are supported once they are
purchased by the military. First, an overview of the Acquisition Logistics Support
Process and its relevance to CI/NDI acquisition will be presented. Then, a discussion of
several logistical support strategies used for CI/NDI items will be presented followed by
a summary.
B. ACQUISITION LOGISTICS
Acquisition logistics was formerly known as the Integrated Logistics Support
(ILS) concept. The acquisition logistic support process is the method by which the
program manager of a weapon system attempts to reduce the cost of weapon system
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support by integrating and analyzing all logistic support factors into the equipment design
process system as soon as possible. The cost of systems modification to enhance logistics
supportability increases dramatically as a project proceeds through the phases of design,
manufacture, and support. Therefore, integration of logistics support considerations early
on in the acquisition cycle is critical to success. (Ref. 20:p. 2) Acquisition personnel use
two main components of planning and research to integrate logistics into a weapon
system: Logistics Management Information (LMI) and Support Analyses Summaries
(SAS). These concepts are further explored below.
1. Logistics Management Information
Generating the information and infrastructure necessary to support a project is
organized into the Logistics Management Information (LMI) system and Supportability
Analysis Summaries (SAS). LMI was previously known as the Logistics Support
Analysis (LSA) process. The products of this process are Supportability Analysis
Summaries (SAS). The format of SASs are contained in DOD document MIL-PRF-
49506, and coincide with the Support Element (SE) concept of logistics management.
LMI and SASs describe information required by the government to perform acquisition
logistics management functions. It is intended to replace the old Logistics Support
Analysis Record (LSAR), and is also a fundamental change in the way data requirements
are levied in contracts. The principle focus is on providing the DOD with a contractual
method for acquiring support and support-related engineering and logistics data from
contractors. The DOD uses this data in-house in existing DOD materiel management
processes such as those for initial provisioning, cataloging, and item management. (Ref.
25 :p. 4-14)
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2. Supportability Analysis Summaries (SAS)
These are packages of data that the DOD logistics managers use to conduct
logistics planning and analysis, influence program decisions, assess design status, and
verify contractor performance. SASs are not all inclusive or exclusive and are
intentionally described in general terms to encourage maximum contractor flexibility.
The content of the summaries is not limited to information and data products cited in the
LMI specification. They can be delivered as stand-alone reports or as an integral part of
other systems engineering documentation. The contract between the government and the
commercial producer will specify the specific content of each summary. (Ref. 42:p. 1)
(a) Maintenance Planning
These summaries provide maintenance planning information to the
government that may be used to develop initial fielding plans for the support structure of
the finished product. These summaries may also be used to verify that the maintenance
actions and support structure are aligned with the government's requirements and
maintenance concept. The information contained within these summaries is associated
with repairable items to the level of detail specified in the contract. It identifies all
preventive and corrective maintenance actions along with the required spares and support
equipment. These summaries also provide supporting information justifying the need for
each maintenance action, e.g., elapsed time of maintenance actions; task frequency;
failure rate of an item; Mean Time To Repair an item; and an item's man-hour allocation
by maintenance action and level. (Ref. 42:p. 1)
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(b) Repair Analysis
These summaries provide the program manager with conclusions and
recommendations of the maintenance repair analysis. They are also used to develop
initial fielding plans for the end item's support structure. The conclusions may include a
listing of which items should be repaired and which should be discarded. These
summaries may identify the level of maintenance at which items should be repaired, and
associated costs. They also identify for the system support structure, the operational
readiness achieved, and the placement and allocation of spares, support equipment, and
personnel. (Ref. 42:p. 1)
(c) Support and Test Equipment
These summaries provide data necessary to register, or verify the registry
of, the support or test equipment in the government's inventory. They may provide
details of the Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) calibration
procedures, technical parameters, and any piece of support equipment needed to support
the required support equipment. (Ref. 42:p. 1)
(d) Supply Support
These summaries provide the government with information on static and
application related hardware information which may be used to determine initial
requirements and cataloging of support items to be procured through the provisioning
process. They may include the identification of the system breakdown, maintenance
coding, maintenance replacement factors, overhaul rates, roll-up quantities, design
change information, and associated technical manuals, as applicable. (Ref. 42:p. 1)
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(e) Manpower, Personnel, and Training
These summaries provide information to the government so it can
establish training plans and ensure manpower and personnel constraints are met. The
information contained within this report should identify items' corrective and preventive
maintenance tasks, operations tasks, manpower estimates for each task by maintenance
level, personnel skills required to perform the maintenance tasks, and any training
required to allow these tasks to be performed. (Ref. 42 :p. 2)
(/) Facilities
These summaries identify the facilities required to maintain, operate, train
personnel for, and test an item. The facilities may be organizational, intermediate, or
depot maintenance facilities, training facilities, or mobile and test facilities. This helps
plan for any modification to an existing facility or development of a new facility. (Ref.
42:p. 2)
(g) Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation.
These summaries identify packaging, handling, and storage requirements.
This information helps in the development of a transportability analysis report. All
information within this summary is associated with repairable items to the level of detail
specified on contract. (Ref. 42 :p. 2)
(h) Post Production Support
The purpose of these summaries is to analyze life cycle support
requirements of the new system, equipment, or software prior to closing of production
lines to ensure sufficient resources are secured for the system's remaining life. They
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identify support items associated with the system that will present potential problems due
to inadequate sources of supply, support capability, or modification after shutdown of
production lines. They also identify alternative solutions for anticipated support
difficulties during the remaining life of the system. General topics that may also be
addressed in these summaries are manufacturing, repair centers, data modifications,
supply management, configuration management, and other related areas. (Ref. 42 :p. 2)
C. LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS DURING CI/NDI ACQUISITION
In the previous chapter, it was noted that the decision to use CI or NDI is made at
the very beginning of an acquisition project. If CI or NDI is appropriate for the
operational need specified in the Mission Needs Statement (MNS), market investigations
are initiated to identify available products. Once items are identified, an analysis of the
existing logistics data is conducted to:
• assess standardization issues;
• compare to similar systems;
• determine and evaluate any support alternatives;
• determine the impact CI/NDI introduction will have on existing fleet support;
• assess sources of support once production ceases.
Following this analysis, the CI/NDI decision is made, and the process to obtain
logistics products (spare parts, repair facilities, support equipment, etc.) to support the
system begins. The logistics considerations for a project are addressed at the start of any
procurement by a systems engineering approach. Systems engineering is a set of inter-
'
related analysis efforts whose end product is translating the operational needs expressed
by the customer, in this case the Department of Defense, into a system design that meets
performance, cost, and schedule requirements (Ref. 25 :p 4-12). Put simply, it is a
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process that systematically eliminates conflicts in the acquisition effort, and integrates
hardware, software, and logistics resources (spare parts, repair facilities, transportation
systems, etc.) into a finished weapon system or product the military can use efficiently
and effectively. Functional analysis, requirements analysis, and systems analysis are the



























Figure 10. Systems Engineering Process Flow (Ref. 25 :p. 4-13)
Each area of analysis, is in essence, a detailed series of "what if" questions
designed to ensure the weapon system meets the criteria set by the customer. For CI/NDI
projects, the design of the product has already been completed, thus the systems
engineering effort focuses on the acquisition logistics discipline. Acquisition logistics
(formerly Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)) determines the best set of planned logistics
resources for a given system. The main focus of acquisition logistics is to ensure a high
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degree of supportability of the system once it is fielded and used within DOD. This is
accomplished by analyzing a number of support issues for the project, and eliminating
conflicts by considering the effect each has on the overall system. Specifically,
supportability analysis evaluates existing support structures in conjunction with
force/fleet analysis, threat analysis, and doctrine development (Ref. 25 :p. 4-10).
Acquisition logistics is conducted through each phase of a project's acquisition. Usually
phases are usually combined in a CI/NDI project, and it is not unusual to have a
Milestone III decision made to produce, field and deploy a system within two to three
years of the initial MNS. (Ref. 14:p. 1)
D. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT STRATEGIES FOR CI/NDI
There is a great deal of uncertainty in the area of logistical support for a CI/NDI
acquisition. Most items that are commercially-available have only limited after-purchase
support, which is not acceptable for military items that will be in the inventory for many
years. Component substitution in production processes, and other factors result in
logistics support that lasts only 2 to 5 years. Therefore, it is critical for logistics planners
to conduct a thorough analysis of each type of support strategy before proceeding with
operational development and testing. This section will deal with the various strategies
considered for supporting a CI/NDI item of project. The current environment of logistics
support for commercial items will be explained, followed by an analysis of the benefits
and challenges of several support strategies.
Several efforts have been underway to identify some of these uncertainties in
order to allow military operators to operate and maintain their equipment for entire
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service life of the item. Areas of focus were:
• Maintenance Support




Some strategies used to combat these problems were: spare parts and technical data
buyouts, escrow for technical data needed for Government use following the end of
commercial support, and emphasizing system life-cycle and commercial logistics support
availability. (Ref. 18:p. 4)
In general, there are four basic methods being used to provide logistic support for
a CI/NDI item. First, there is no support, where enough spares are bought up-front to last
the life-cycle of the system. Second, full contractor support is considered where
commercial entities have full responsibility to repair and replace items. Third is organic
support, where the government supplies all resources needed to repair and replace all
aspects of the system. Fourth, is a combination of both contractor and organic support,
where responsibilities are delineated for both parties. Each method will be discussed
below in terms of advantages and disadvantages.
1. No Support (NS)
This method works by simply replacing failed parts or systems with previously
purchased spares. These items are usually known as a "non-repairable item" (NRI) and
choosing this support method implies that it is simply cheaper to replace the item than to
return it to a serviceable condition. NRIs are usually composed of components that are
low cost, which can justify disposal once failure occurs. (Ref. 4:p. 32)
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(a) Advantages
There is minimal logistics support for this strategy. No lower-level spare
parts are needed, since each item is treated as a whole unit instead of multiple
components. Maintenance test equipment costs are also less, since only initial system
check-out and ready-for-use certification is needed. Maintenance design is minimal,
since no test ports, plug in assemblies, or internal accessibility is needed. Personnel
training costs are lowered since minimal maintenance skills are needed for a remove-and-
replace maintenance action. (Ref. 4:p. 33)
(b) Disadvantages
Having no support structure means having a higher inventory level than
for a repairable item. This would mean higher inventory costs if the government
purchases all the spares for a system. Also, this method does not work well with items
that have a long service life. There is no provision for any modifications, and no ability
to integrate new technology into the system.
2. Total Contractor Support (TCS)
This method involves establishing contractual responsibility for all system
maintenance with a commercial contractor. Items needing repair are sent to a
commercial source responsible for repairing the item and returning it to serviceable
condition. This support can be used most effectively in a non-combat environment, since
cycle time for deployed units in wartime can be prohibitively long. Combat effectiveness
is also an issue with this strategy, since there is dependence on outside sources to
maintain equipment directly involved in combat. (Ref. 4:p. 34)
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(a) Advantages
Government risk management for repairable items is reduced when this
method is used. Tools and test equipment costs are lowered since there is no support
structure owned by the government. Maintenance personnel and training costs are also
lowered as a result of the smaller infrastructure. (Ref. 4:p. 35)
(b) Disadvantages
Total dependency on commercial sources for system supportability means
additional risk in excessive maintenance costs ifMTBF goes down. In other words, if
failure rates on equipment begin to rise, unanticipated maintenance cost will rise due to
the increased demand for contractor support. Also, quality control could become an issue
as time increases, since the government has less control in the management of
maintenance practices. Untimely and inadequate support could result with untrustworthy
contractors, which will in turn affect combat effectiveness, if not well planned for. Also,
incompatibility can become an issue, as commercial maintenance practices change due to
technological advancements, personnel rotations, and other factors. (Ref. 4:p. 35)
3. Organic Support (OS)
This method implies that the military organization purchasing the system has all
the maintenance skills, equipment, personnel and system-specific resources to provide
their own support system. This has been the way that the DOD has usually provided
logistics support in the past:
Traditional logistics presupposes that organic support is the mandatory
option. Again, this may be true for some systems and generally can be
accomplished for all systems if cost is not a consideration. But efficient
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and effective support depends on their ability to influence system design
and parts selection. Otherwise, we accept the risk of costly sole-source
parts supply, including maintenance manuals, testing equipment, and
technical data. We also risk a system design freeze to a baseline with
additional costs to maintain the production base. (Ref 24:p. 46)
Organic support is organized into three levels of maintenance: Organizational (O-level),
intermediate (I-level), and depot. Personnel who actually use the equipment perform
organizational maintenance. The maintenance departments in U.S. Navy aircraft
squadrons are a good example of this type of maintenance. Usually, maintenance is
limited to equipment performance checks, external adjustments, and remove-and-replace
maintenance actions. In terms of system knowledge, O-level maintenance requires the
lowest level of education and skills. (Ref. 4:p. 36)
Mobile, semi-mobile, and/or specialized organizations and installations perform
intermediate maintenance. Tasks for I-level maintenance usually include more
sophisticated trouble-shooting using test and support equipment, removal and
replacement of major assemblies, and making repairs to modular equipment that O-level
maintenance personnel are not qualified to perform. These tasks are generally more
detailed and involved than operational level maintenance. The Aviation Intermediate
Maintenance Department (AIMD) on board an aircraft carrier is an example of this level
of maintenance. (Ref. 4 :p. 37)
Depot maintenance is where all other maintenance tasks that are too complex for
the I-level and O-level are accomplished. This level usually involves specialized
facilities that handle a large number of spare parts, and complete weapon systems, such
as tanks, aircraft, and watercraft. Depot level maintenance is where complete overhaul,
rebuild, and calibration of equipment occurs. (Ref. 4:p. 37)
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(a) Advantages
Organic Support (OS) contains the infrastructure needed to support
systems that have high failure rates and large populations (Ref. 24:p. 45) large inventory
capability, extensive repair capability, and a self-contained transportation system enable
OS to support the high maintenance demand of these systems. OS also is better suited to
combat environments, since repair facilities and infrastructure are carried close to the
battlefield in times of war. OS infrastructure could also be utilized to help develop new
support structures for future systems. (Ref. 4:p. 38)
(b) Disadvantages
One main disadvantage ofOS is that risk management of system failure
becomes solely the responsibility of the government. This means that future support or
analysis of system performance must be completed by government sources, since there is
no incentive for original manufacturers to provide resources to improve or support a
product that is already paid for. The analogy of a warranty on a computer bought by an
individual demonstrates this concept. Once the warranty expires, any system failure and
subsequent repair expense must be borne by the customer. Therefore, failure rates may
be engineered to coincide with the expiration date of the warranty. Another disadvantage
is that technical data, unless specified under the purchasing contract, may be needed at a
later date to develop a logistical support structure. Systems using OS also should be
repairable, and have some salvage value. With many CI/NDI systems, the short
acquisition cycle-time usually precludes the development of a fully-organic support
structure. (Ref. 24:p. 45)
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4. Organic Contractor Mix (Hybrid Support)
This method involves sharing maintenance responsibilities and system failure risk
between both the contractor and the government. In this arrangement, the government
usually assumes the organizational maintenance tasks, while the contractor provides the
depot level tasks. (Ref. 4:p. 39)
(a) Advantages
Some of the characteristics of systems that use this method would be those
that do not fall into the non-repairable category, are not suited for total contractor
support, and have long service lives, as opposed to technology-insertion systems.
(b) Disadvantages
It may be difficult to control the transition from one method to another.
Any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of contract stipulations could result in a loss
of support, especially critical in wartime. These misunderstanding also could cause
delays in all phases of acquisition.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided background and analysis on the logistic support issues
faced by military planners when purchasing CI/NDI items. An overview of the
Acquisition Logistics process was presented, and several support strategies for CI/NDI
procurements were discussed. The next chapter will provide a case study on a logistics
support strategy currently in use.
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IV. P-3C ORION CASE STUDY
In order to analyze the different support strategies involved in CI/NDI
procurement, a case study will be used to demonstrate the benefits and shortcomings of a
chosen strategy. This chapter will provide a background of the P-3C Orion and the AIP
program. Then, an analysis of several support strategies used for the equipment
purchased in this program will be presented. Finally, a summary of the information
analyzed will be provided.
A. BACKGROUND
This section will present a brief history of the procurement of the P-3 Orion, an
overview of the Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program (AIP), and the current
status of the program.
1. P-3 Procurement History
The P-3 was developed to replace both the land-based Lockheed P2V Neptune
and the Martin P5M Marlin as the Navy's principal maritime patrol aircraft. It is based on
the Lockheed Electra airliner that has been in production since 1957. The first P-3
aerodynamic prototype flight occurred on August 19, 1958. The first operational P-3A
deployed in August 1 962 and was designed to provide long loitering capabilities over
high cruise speeds in order to perform its' Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and maritirhe
patrol missions. The P-3 Orion was manufactured in three model types; the P-3A, B, and
C. (Ref. 26:p 2)
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Lockheed enjoyed the benefits of being the sole-source provider of this aircraft
until November 1985 when the Navy, hoping to reduce costs, decided to try to acquire an
improved P-3C, called the P-3G, on an open competition basis. The goal was to obtain
125 aircraft to replace the large number of P-3As and P-3Bs reaching the end of their
service lives between 1992 and 1997. Besides replacing the aging aircraft, three specific
reasons were cited in a GAO Report:
• The P-3C cannot reach some of its patrol areas and still have adequate flying
time left to patrol those areas. In time of war, this problem will be
exacerbated as foreign airbases could be denied.
• To deal with the future threat, the aircraft needs to be able to carry larger
payloads of mission avionics and ordnance in order to perform its mission
effectively.
• A newer aircraft with newer technology may be less expensive to support.
(Ref. 26:p 4)
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved the P-3G program in
July 1986 and changed the name of the aircraft to the P-7 Long-Range Air ASW
Capability Aircraft (LRAACA). The first production aircraft was to be delivered in
March of 1993 with an estimated unit cost between $32-40 million dollars (fiscal year
1987 dollars). But due to the decreasing DOD budgets in the 90 's, commonality with the
P-3 declining from an anticipated 20 percent to near zero, and a one-to-two year delay
required for re-design, the P-7 program was canceled in July 1990. (Ref. 26:p 5)
Throughout the service life of this aircraft, many modifications and updates have
been implemented. The last model in the series, the P-3C, is currently used by U.S.
Navy squadrons. Three electronic package updates were performed on the sensor and
data collection equipment within the aircraft. The final update implemented in the P-3C,
the Update III package, is in use for all active duty squadrons, and is the equipment that
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is being integrated into the AIP program. The current fleet consists of 180 P-3s in 12
active squadrons and 8 in reserve squadrons. (Ref. 27:p 1) At the time of printing of this
thesis. Rear Admiral Dennis McGinn, Chief ofNaval Warfare, has initiated a study for a
follow-on platform to replace the P-3 in the 2015 time-frame. The project is likely to
select a commercial aircraft derivative rather than invest in a military-unique solution.
(Ref. 36 :p. 1). The AIP program is now in full production and units have been delivered
to the Fleet Replacement Squadron (VP-30), and two operational squadrons in Hawaii,
Patrol Squadron Nine (VP-9), and Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4). (Ref. 40:p. 1)
2. AIP Program
The P-3C Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program (AIP) was initiated during
the 1994 fiscal year due to the cancellation of the P-7 and the cancellation of a P-3C
Update IV program, originally proposed in October of 1992 (Ref. 29:p. 2). The program
was a direct response to a fleet requirement for capabilities that were needed for the new
missions being assigned to the Maritime Patrol Aviation community. This subsection
will look at the program history, capabilities, funding, and current status.
The growing demand for fresh, immediate intelligence concerning international
hot spots has brought renewed interest in the P-3. The aircraft is relatively simple to
operate and maintain and has modest logistics needs. Maintenance personnel and
aircrews of the P-3C are accustomed to far-flung deployments on short notice. Using
equipment that is incorporated into the AIP program, several P-3's currently in service
have become a crucial photographic reconnaissance tool for operations to monitor
peacekeeping in Bosnia and to track the new crisis in Albania. In 1997 and 1998, during
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14 months of operations in this area, Navy patrol squadrons flew 324 missions and
looked at 2,425 targets. (Ref. 38:p. 1) Another example is Exercise Foal Eagle '97 in
Korea. Air Force E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft
down-linked data to an Amphibious Squadron staff and Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) command element in the supporting arms
coordination center (SACC) on the Belleau Wood (LHA-3) which in turn directed a P-3C
reconnaissance aircraft against the targets, resulting in a direct video display of enemy
activity on the ground. (Ref. 27:p. 38). These capabilities are not available on a P-3C that
does not have the AIP improvement package.
The objective of the AIP acquisition program was to purchase Commercial Items
(CI) and/or Non-developmental Items (NDI) for installation in 50 P-3C Update III
aircraft in order to provide a significant increase in the P-3C's capabilities. The program
was designed to rapidly improve fleet operational capabilities at an affordable cost in the
areas of Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Over-the Horizon Targeting (OTH-T),
•2
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C I), and survivability. This was
to be accomplished by building an integrated improvement "kit" that provided
enhancements in sensors, communications, displays and controls, survivability and
vulnerability, and weapons capability. Total life-cycle cost of each kit was estimated at
approximately 1.5 million dollars for this twenty-year program. Sources of the
equipment were a combination of contractor-furnished equipment (CFE) and government
furnished equipment (GFE) (Ref. 28 :p. 8). Key items in the AIP kit include:
• A new generation of AVX-1 roll-on-off long-range, electro-optical, daylight
video cameras;
• An Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (APS-1 37B) with both a range in excess
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of 100 mi. and the ability to pick out an object as small as a submarine
snorkel;
• An improved infrared detecting set with double the resolution of the unit
currently installed. The prime contractor has selected WESCAM, an electro-
optical systems provider, to provide two systems with the option of 1 60
additional units; (Ref. 37:p. 1)
• An improved high-data-rate communications suite to include multiple circuits
on a single satellite channel. The suite also utilizes frequency hopping Ultra-
High-Frequency (UHF) to limit the effects ofjamming and narrow-band
satellite communications;
• The capability of firing Maverick standoff missiles;
• The addition of a chaff-and-flare survivability package. (Ref. 38:p. 2)
Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense Systems is the prime contractor for building the AIP
kits. In 1 996, the company was selected to provide a Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) advanced development system and install it on a P-3C to prove the
concept. (Ref. 41 :p. 1)
There are currently two programs that provide funding for the AIP program; the
P-3 modernization program, and the P-3 modification program. Modernization refers to
only AIP funding, whereas the modification program refers to AIP funding, Sustained
Readiness Programs (SRP), and other funding needed for the P-3 Orion. As with all
scarce resources, competition for these "modification" dollars is fierce, and the AIP
program funding varies as the fleet needs vary from year to year (Ref. 43). In fiscal year
(FY) 1998, 3.2 million dollars were budgeted for the P-3 modernization program.
Congress raised this amount in a "plus-up" of 1 million dollars in the FY 1 998 Defense
appropriation and authorization bills. This was done to accelerate the integration of the
AIP sensors into fleet aircraft. Three million dollars is budgeted for the AIP program in
FY99. (Ref.41:p. 5)
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In FY 98, 164.9 million dollars were budgeted for the modification program.
Authorization bills increased this funding by 50.3 million dollars to include two
additional AIP kits at 8.65 million dollars each, and 34 million dollars for the SRP
program and other systems. The appropriation bills approved this spending increase and
added an additional 23 million dollars for more computer upgrades to the aircraft. (Ref
27:p. 37)
The AIP program is currently in production with 44 upgrade kits on order. The
pilot production aircraft (PPA) was delivered to the fleet training squadron (VP-30) in
January, 1998. The first production aircraft was delivered to VP-9 in March, 1998. Four
aircraft entered the upgrade line in the first quarter of FY98. Currently, 6 P-3Cs are in
modification, 28 AIP kits are on order, and 16 more kits are in the budget for completion
in 2001/2 (Ref. 27:p 38). In an effort to provide standardized training for fleet operators
using AIP aircraft, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) awarded a 8.9
million dollar firm-fixed price contract to Hughes Training, Incorporated, for the design
and fabrication of a Partial Aircrew Coordination Trainer (AIP PACT) in July of 1998.
This system should be completed by October 1998. (Ref. 39:p. 1)
B. SUPPORT STRATEGIES FOR THE AIP PROGRAM
This section will provide an overview of the support strategies used for the AIP
program. Benefits and challenges of each method will be discussed, and the challenges
presented to fleet operators will be outlined.
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1. Planned Support Strategy
Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense Systems (LMTDS) became primary contractor
for the AIP program in 1 994, and was responsible for providing interim support in terms
of repair facilities and spares for one year. LMTDS began a Logistic Support Analysis
(LSA) in 1994, which is ongoing. Support strategies for the AIP program are divided
into two types of equipment: contractor furnished equipment (CFE), and government
furnished equipment (GFE). LMTDS has been the responsible party to secure spare and
repair parts for CFE, while in place organic systems are used to provide support for GFE.
(Ref. 4 1 ) The central command for parts support for the Navy is the Naval Inventory
Control Point (NAVICP). NAVICP's job is to act as the central receiving and
coordinating point for the P-3 community and LMTDS in terms of spare parts and
securing transportation for those parts from the manufacturer to the affected unit.
GFE support strategies are previously existing support structures. For example,
the APS-137 radar has been installed on the P-3 since the late 80's and the maintenance
support and information necessary for that system already exists in the Navy Aviation
and Maintenance Program (NAMP). The maintenance plans for the AIP version of the
radar have been updated and sent to the navy logistics managers that are affected. This
includes the APS 137 radar, and the ALE-47/AAR-46 chaff dispenser and radar warning
equipment. (Ref. 41)
The initial support strategy for commercial equipment is an Operator to Original
Equipment Manufacturer strategy, or O-to-OEM concept. A typical support cycle for an
aircraft using this system is as follows: identification of faulty equipment is accomplished
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at the operational level. NAVICP, in the case of the AIP program, acts as a holder for the
part until it is sent to the primary contractor, in this case, Lockheed Martin Tactical Data
Systems (LMTDS). LMTDS utilizes various existing repair contracts to fix and return
the part, or ship the repair item to the original manufacturer.
2. Current Support Strategy
Current support strategy for the system is an extension of the original interim
support. NAVICP has secured a warehouse in Tennessee owned by the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) and holds all repair parts for the program there. Federal
Express (FEDEX) manages the facility and provides the commercial transportation
needed to get spare and repair parts to the fleet squadrons that order them. The warehouse
inventory is totally visible to the NAVICP computer system, and in terms of inventory
control, is treated as just another NAVICP inventory resource. Fleet squadrons generate
a part requisition, and processing and delivery of that part is handled by FEDEX like
other commercial items, and it is very effective.
The NAVICP/FEDEX support strategy was originally implemented as a risk
mitigation technique used in response to an initial spare parts availability problem early
in the program. The Navy supply system used to provide parts for organic support
systems takes an average of 30 to 40 days to provide a part, from the initial request to
delivery, which proved inadequate for the AIP program. The cycle time for AIP repair
parts ranges from 24 hours to 3 to 5 days depending on where the affected unit is located
in the world. In general, cycle times are shorter the closer the affected unit is to the
commercial transportation network. Aircraft that need spare parts while forward
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deployed at remote sites are experiencing a 3 to 5 day waiting period for a part if it is
actually in the system.(Ref. 41)
3. Challenges and advantages of current support strategy
The aircraft ICS system and the radar system are currently having maintenance
problems. Total replacement of the AIP ICS system with VP-5 in Bahrain had to be
conducted for 2 systems, primarily due to faulty parts and unanticipated temperature
fluctuations (aircraft are subjected to 160 degree plus heat while sitting on the ramp in
Bahrain). The MTBF rates in the APS-137 radar, and the ICS system are higher than
originally anticipated. The AIP program management office is in the process of
purchasing a test set that will be installed at a Navy Depot maintenance facility that will
provide an organic depot level capability to change out defective sub-assemblies in the
APS-137 radar. The strategy is to use Raytheon corporation to repair data processing
cards, instead of entire radar units. This strategy should result in cost savings for items
that have high repair rates in the radar unit. (Ref 41) Part of the organic support structure
for the P-3 Orion is the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP). The NADEP currently has the
capability to run a check and test on pull and replace equipment on the GFE and for some
CFE in the AIP program. Many commercial items used in the AIP program have had no
instances of failure. The antenna combiner unit for the satellite communications system
is a good example of this. The units in place have been operable for 2 years with no calls
for service or spares. (Ref. 44) Barko Corporation has been manufacturing the new data
displays being used in the system. Some failures have occurred, and using the O-to-OEM
strategy, turnaround time has been within 2 weeks. Normal turnaround time for several
comparable units in the Navy supply system is 30 to 40 days. (Ref. 41)
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Obsolescence occurs quickly in this strategy. At the time of this writing, several
parts for the AIP system have already gone out of production. The decision not to adopt
a total buy-out strategy was made to keep costs low and to keep the ability to insert new
technology as it becomes available. A buy out strategy would keep the system at one
level of technological development. There is no cost effective means to provide an
organic support structure for equipment purchased with an O-to-OEM maintenance
concept. This is due mainly to the lack of proprietary data, the costs of data rights,
drawings, and the infrastructure necessary in an organic support structure, since they are
not purchased beforehand. The data itself can be prohibitively expensive once the units
are purchased. For example, to get the source data from Texas Instruments to create a
technical troubleshooting guide for the APS-137 radar set is estimated at 25 million
dollars. (Ref. 41)
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations in providing a
logistics strategy for a CI/NDI program, followed by suggestions for further study.
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis examined the logistics support concepts used in a Commercial
Item/Non-developmental Item acquisition program. The research focused on how
effective the chosen logistics strategy is in terms of planned failure rates in fleet units,
and effective delivery time for spare parts when a failure actually occurs.
Primary Research Question:
• Is there an ideal method of providing logistic support for Commercial and
Non-Developmental Items used in the P-3C AIP Program?
The AIP program was implemented before and during the radical change in
defense acquisition, between the years of 1 994 and 1 996. The logistics support systems
in place for CI/NDI systems in the U.S. Navy are currently undergoing change from a
primarily organic, government supply system, to a flexible, demand-driven commercial
support structure. There is no adequate way to determine the most advantageous
logistical support system during this transition period from government support to
commercial support. However, the most common factors of an effective support system
for military equipment is one which is cost effective, that is responsive to the needs of
fleet units, and one that provides high-quality parts and services for the life of the project.
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Secondary Research Questions
• What are the advantages and disadvantages when using a CI/NDI procurement
strategy?
The use of existing, previously-developed items saves research and development
costs, shortens fielding time, and reduces risks associated with new development. The
private sector now leads the military defense establishment in developing state-of-the-art
technology. Therefore, the Department of Defense must now buy from the commercial
market to obtain these products. Thus, another advantage of this strategy is the ability to
provide state-of-the-art products to fleet operators in the same time frame as a normal
commercial customer could obtain them. Finally, the CI/NDI procurement strategy helps
to integrate the defense and commercial industrial bases. DOD requirements that are
integrated into commercial production are far more likely to have a stable and existing
industrial base to draw on if there is a surge in requirements due to an emergency. Also,
in times of reduced procurement, DOD business is not sufficient to keep many defense-
unique suppliers in business. Integrated commercial and defense production is beneficial
for the nation's security and economy in the long run.
A disadvantage of the CI/NDI strategy is that the analysis required to determine
the logistics support products that are needed for the system can be overlooked.
Procuring and integrating logistics support products such as maintenance and training
manuals, repair facilities, and spare parts inventories occurs in a shorter time frame than
normal procurement strategies. Therefore, the time required to analyze all available
support options decreases. This can result in a lack of support once the unit is in the
field. Most likely, logistics support activities are accelerated to fit the quicker delivery
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schedule for these systems, and usually become degraded in the process.
Another disadvantage is that fundamental differences between government
incentives and commercial incentives may result in support strategies that do not support
government goals. When contractors purchase support products under commercial
buying practices, the incentive is to obtain the best value for the company, and in turn, to
maximize profit. In contrast, government buying practices are geared by public law to
maximize opportunity and competition, effect change through socio-ecomic provisions
(awarding contracts to government-identified special interest groups), and to spend tax
dollars prudently. By depending on commercial support for the life of a program, the
Government might have to sacrifice some of it's goals in order to provide the needed
support in the field.
• What are the primary logistic support strategies used by the Navy for a
CI/NDI procurement strategy?
The primary logistic support strategy used by the Navy in a CI/NDI procurement
is interim contractor support during development, and either full contractor support or an
Operational to Original equipment manufacturer (O-to-OEM) support strategy. For those
contracts using Government furnished equipment, existing organic support structures are
used.
• What form of logistics support was contracted for at the beginning of the
program and what were the advantages and disadvantages of that support
strategy?
The logistics support strategy for the AIP program was full contractor support for
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the interim phase of the project, which was to develop into a Naval support strategy once
the program was in full production. The O-to-OEM maintenance strategy was to be used
for contractor furnished equipment, and organic support was to be used for Government
furnished equipment.
An advantage of using this strategy was the flexibility in using previously
available support from the Navy and the original equipment manufacturers (OEM).
OEMs of all the equipment in the AIP program have an incentive to provide the best
support available in the initial phases of development, since competition can eliminate
them for consideration. The program manager for the AIP program was able to pick and
choose the best products available due to this flexibility. Another advantage was easier
integration ofGFE due to using available government support. The radar set , the radar
warning system, and the chaff dispenser are all supported in the Navy and Air Force
supply systems. Integrating the support needs of the AIP system was relatively easy.
Using this support strategy shifted the emphasis on fielding the equipment
purchased for the AIP system, instead of fielding a "weapons system". The lead times
needed to buy and manufacture spare parts, and to field support equipment was
decreased, and as a result AIP kits were put into the fleet without parts available for them
if failures occurred. This has resulted in the logistics program manager competing with
the production line for spare parts.
For commercial items, there was inadequate logistics data from the beginning of
the program. In most cases, logistics data describing the support structures necessary and
the failure rates for individual equipment did not exist. As well, the particular
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environment used in the P-3 Orion is different from the other environments that the
equipment was initially designed for. Since the timeline for production was accelerated,
the time needed to generate data from the PPA wasn't adequate to accurately assess all
the different modes of operation. (Ref 41)
The criticality analysis or the failure/modes analysis that is usually accomplished
in the beginning of a program was eliminated as a cost saving measure for the AIP
program. The logic at the time was that the CI/NDI items could not be changed, since
they were already designed, and therefore would not affect the design variables of the
system. This analysis is the starting point for designing and implementing a logistics
support program for most weapon systems. Eliminating it resulted in a lot of guesswork
by the program logistics team, deciding what tasks and modes to provide maintenance
tasks and parts for. Without the benefit of this analysis, the process to design a support
structure may miss some variables for repair parts. A good example of this difficulty is
the establishment of manual fault isolation tasks. Development for a program of this size
usually results in 900 to 1400 tasks being generated, if a criticality analysis is done. The
AMPL staff generated only about 40 to 1 00 tasks. Therefore, the cost savings realized by
using CI/NDI could be reduced by the additional cost of identifying and correcting the
support structure and the equipment only when fleet personnel detected a problem,
instead of at the beginning of the program. (Ref 41)
• What form of logistics support is currently provided for the P-3C Orion AIP
program?
Currently, the AIP program is supported by NAVICP and its warehousing of all
available spare parts at a premium transportation central warehouse in Tennessee. This
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warehouse is owned by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and managed by Federal
Express. Parts are requisitioned by fleet squadrons and delivered via the FEDEX
transportation system. The inventory is fully visible to the NAVICP database and is
treated as a normal inventory holding point for high demand items for the AIP program.
Using FEDEX as the primary transportation system results in a marked decrease in cycle
time from three weeks to three to five days.
• What ways are available to improve the effectiveness of logistic support for
CI/NDI programs similar to the P-3C Orion AIP program?
CI/NDI programs have very short logistics planning cycles, since the first three
phases of a normal acquisition are combined into one Milestone. Early identification of
the logistics strategy is critical for these programs. The failure rates specified for the
equipment purchased in CI/NDI programs must be reliable. Holding contractors
responsible for achieving established failure rates must be an integral part of the
contracting process.
During the initial planning stages of a CI/NDI procurement is the best time to
decide the support strategy for the life of the project. It is usually not cost-effective to
design a completely organic support structure for CI/NDI systems. The time and costs
associated with developing organic support structures usually exceed the life-cycle cost
of buying replacement parts when needed. (Ref. 44.) Advances in technology continue to
occur rapidly, and system upgrades occur within a few years after the initial purchase.
'
Expected service lives ofmany CI/NDI systems are measured in two to four years, not
the 1 to 20 years like many military weapon systems.
Support strategies that use non-traditional methods, such as extended warranties,
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disposal on failure, etc, might be the most cost-effective method to provide support to the
system. Also, proven NDI/CI systems have reliable failure rate data, allowing for more
accurate planning in terms of inventory purchase. CI maintenance manuals and drawings
are limited in their ability to troubleshoot and repair items beyond "plug and replace"
maintenance concepts. Additional data concerning technical specifications for CIs
usually involve proprietary data, for which the manufacturer usually demands an
inordinate sum of money.
The risk of unavailable support in times of conflict is a very real concern for
military logistics planners that use contractor support. Despite contractual agreements
between a commercial entity and the government, companies may open themselves up to
subversion and attack if eliminating that company could reduce the combat effectiveness
of U.S. fighting forces. Spare parts and maintenance support for advance units could
evaporate if companies that provide support to combat units are targeted by the enemy.
For example, terrorist attacks on FEDEX employees and assets could eliminate that
company as a method of combat support. Companies are global in scope, and expecting
them to become patriotic in a unpopular mission could result in military personnel being
put at risk.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Hold contractors accountable. Established failure rates and services that are
specified in contractual agreements should be rock solid, and failure to hold those
standards should be dealt with swiftly and effectively. Establishing a precedent in
contractual disputes that demonstrates the governments resolve to get what it pays for
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could help in keeping contractors honest in terms of representing their products
accurately.
Putting personnel with current fleet experience on logistics support teams
should also be a priority. The user perspective during the logistic planning process would
prove invaluable when organizing the system necessary to provide the operators with the
right equipment at the right time.
Supportability analysis should begin as soon as possible to identify the
support strategy once a commercial or non-developmental system is chosen. One of the
most important challenges to be met when establishing logistics support for CI/NDI items
is adapting the existing support structure and data to the new mission or use of the
equipment. For example, the ALE-47 chaff dispenser has the same operational mission
on the P-3 as it does on the F-18, but the airspeeds, missions, and operational
environment of the two aircraft are very different, and thus may affect the logistic support
of that item.
Ensure support strategies address the issue of obsolescence and that, if no
proprietary data is available for parts and items, many manufacturers are available and
are easily replaceable.
Rather than acquiring CI equipment and support capability on separate
contracts, it is beneficial to acquire them together.
Specifying the support strategy early-on in the procurement process, and then
specifying the exact nature of the support in the equipment purchase contract (number of
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spare parts, procedures for replacement and repair, not-later-than dates, replacement
guarantees according to location, etc.), usually result in the most effective contractor
support. Replacement of the ICS system in Bahrain for VP-5 is a good example of this
support strategy. Using commercial standards can also help in maintaining the ability to
upgrade and adapt to changing technology.
"Disposable" support strategies be adopted for "disposable" systems. As
anyone with a laptop computer can attest, some advanced systems will decrease
dramatically in value as newer technology is introduced, making the system obsolete and
costly to support. In the long run, procuring support systems that are designed to operate
for the life of the equipment, and be discontinued with the system, make more fiscal
sense than continuing to spend dollars on the system to justify the initial expense.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY




What are the risks associated with decreasing inventory levels and more reliance
on full contractor support in a CI/NDI acquisition? There is a definite security issue in
depending on non-military organizations for critical spares and maintenance for combat
systems. What are the security concerns when contracting for the proper amount of spare
and services? Companies in the global marketplace will not necessarily act in the best
interests of the United States, and depending on these companies to do so due to
contractual obligations could lead to inadequate logistics support in times of crisis.
65
2. Does the added benefit of quick fielding time and lower cost outweigh the
logistics support concerns and vulnerability issues for a weapon system? Once a
statistically significant amount of failure data is generated for the AIP program, a cost
benefit analysis that includes the risks and vulnerabilities associated with non-organic
support should be conducted.
3
.
What effect does the lack of standardization have on the logistics support of
weapon systems? Are commercial standards adequate for military use?
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